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In this Article we explore Justice O'Connor's response to the woman question by looking at her opinions on matters traditionally perceived to be of interest to women or matters historically recognized as women's issues. This leads us to consider cases about women as physical and sexual beings and cases about women as nurturers and caretakers. In addition, we look at cases about individuals who, like women, have been traditionally perceived as dependent, vulnerable, and economically insecure. We do not claim that these are the only issues that matter to women. Clearly, the range of issues that matter to women is as broad as the Court's docket. 11. See WOODS & WOODS, supra note 7, at 13; Marie, supra note 9, at 43. Except for summer vacations, O'Connor lived with her grandmother from kindergarten through high school, with a one-year interruption at age thirteen, when homesickness drew her back to Arizona. See Huber, supra note 8, at 507; Marie, supra note 9, at 43.
12. See MAVEETY, supra note 7, at 13; WOODS & WOODS, supra note 7, at 16; Magnuson, supra note 8, at 12.
13. 18. See WOODS & WOODS, supra note 7, at 22. Sources variously describe her office as a "neighborhood law practice," MAVEETY, supra note 7, at 14; "her own law firm in a Phoenix instill a belief that individual action can solve almost any problem. Perhaps less 9 apparent to O'Connor as a young girl was the fact that New Deal programs were critical to saving the ranch from the economic devastation of the Depression. 10 Because there was no school near the ranch, Justice O'Connor lived with her grandmother in El Paso during the school year to attend a private school. She 11 was an exceptional student, graduating from high school at the age of sixteen. 12 She went on to Stanford University and then to Stanford Law School, where she befriended the young William Rehnquist. While at Stanford she also met her 13 future husband, John Jay O'Connor III.
14 Despite her distinguished law school career, O'Connor did not receive a single offer to associate with a law firm after graduation. Her first job was as deputy attorney for San Mateo County, California. One year later, she followed 15 her husband when he was drafted and posted to West Germany. There she worked as a civilian attorney for the United States Army. 16 In 1957, after returning to the United States, Justice O'Connor gave birth to her first child. As a new mother, she opened a law practice in a suburban 17 shopping center. She left the practice two years later when her second child 18 suburb," Magnuson, supra note 8, at 12; and a "small-town type of practice," Marie, supra note 9, at 44 WASHINGTONIAN, Feb. 1994 . "Two things were clear to me from the onset," O'Connor has said about that period:
[O]ne is, I wanted a family, and the second was that I wanted to work-and I love to work . . . . I was very fortunate in my life to have some opportunities to do work which was particularly interesting. I might not have felt the same way if the work hadn't been so interesting, but for me it always was. * * * . . . I think our children grew up expecting me to be working. Because I wasn't always available to them, they had to learn to manage some things on their own and to be a bit more independent than they might otherwise have been. I think in the long run that's an advantage. Marie, supra note 9, at 45.
23. See MAVEETY, supra note 7, at 14; WOODS & WOODS, supra note 7, at 24-25; Cannon, supra note 8, at 56; Magnuson, supra note 8, at 17.
24. See MAVEETY, supra note 7, at 15; WOODS & WOODS, supra note 7, at 34-35; Cannon, supra note 8, at 56; Cook, supra note 13, at 239.
25. See WOODS & WOODS, supra note 7, at 40; Cannon, supra note 8, at 56. 26. See MAVEETY, supra note 7, at 15; Cook, supra note 13, at 239; Marie, supra note 9, at 46. As a trial judge, O'Connor had a reputation for toughness. She prepared thoroughly and was born. Her third and last child was born in 1962. According to O'Connor: 19 20 I found that there was more work than I could do-to go to the office every day and take care of the children. I had a lovely woman who babysat for me with my first child, but she moved to California . . . . It made it impossible at that time to continue my law practice. I was out of the workforce as a regular paid employee for about five years, although I did a lot of volunteer work and other activities. adhere to an absolutist position caused her fellow conservative, Antonin Scalia, to castigate the joint opinion as having "no principled or coherent legal basis." 46 Perhaps equally telling are the internal inconsistencies in the joint opinion's approach to particular parts of the Pennsylvania abortion law before the Court. For example, in reviewing the spousal consent requirement, Justice O'Connor was able to appreciate the indignity of being forced to ask one's husband for permission to have an abortion. Indeed, the joint opinion's sensitivity to the 47 possibility that women needing abortions may be threatened with physical and psychological violence is quite remarkable. After a lengthy review of the prevalence and potency of family violence, the joint opinion concluded: "We must not blind ourselves to the fact that the significant number of women who fear for their safety and the safety of their children are likely to be deterred from procuring an abortion as surely as if the Commonwealth had outlawed abortion in all cases." 48 At the same time, however, the joint opinion seemed blind to other social phenomena, such as child abuse and economic hardship, that could interact with the state's regulations to create equally insurmountable burdens upon a women's choice. Most telling was the opinion's consideration of Pennsylvania's twentyfour hour waiting rule, a type of regulation previously held unconstitutional in Akron. Seemingly oblivious to the very principle of stare decisis they had celebrated in discussing the "core" of Roe, on this issue the joint opinion 49 overruled Akron with barely a nod to the importance of precedent. In so doing, 50 the joint opinion also summarily dismissed facts found by the lower court demonstrating that the twenty-four hour waiting period created an undue burden for poor women.
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The stark contrasts in the opinion's approach to various provisions of the Pennsylvania law suggest the limits of contextualism. Some facts appear more relevant than others. Perhaps not surprisingly, the data that resonated with the authors was that which was closest to their own experiences. While the point is unprovable, it seems quite likely that Justice O'Connor, an upper middle class, highly educated, married woman who had experienced gender discrimination, could appreciate the indignity of having to ask her husband for permission to have an abortion. She could much less readily understand the problems poor women face when they must take two days off from work to undergo the procedure. rather than the abstractions of deductive reasoning, Justice O'Connor found it absurd to conclude that conspiracies to deny access to abortion clinics had 60. Rejecting the argument that animus against women seeking abortions was gendered animus or animus against women as a class, Justice Scalia relied on the holding in Geduldig v. Aeillo, 417 U.S. 484, 494-96, 497 n.20 (1974) . That case held that health insurance coverage that excluded the "disability" of pregnancy was not gender based but, rather, distinguished between pregnant and non-pregnant people. Similarly, Justice Scalia argued in Bray "the disfavoring of abortion . . . is not ipso facto sex discrimination. inquiry. But the context she invariably and almost unwittingly relies upon bears 70 a striking resemblance to the experiences and circumstances of an upper middle class, married, white woman who has managed to combine family with a brilliantly successful career. The experiences of poor women, those who 71 cannot bear children, or those who cannot manage "to have it all," seem distant and largely irrelevant to her decision-making process.
IV. JUSTICE O'CONNOR AND CHILDREN
Sandra Day O'Connor is not only the first woman on the Court, she is the first mother. In a sense this is not surprising: Some 82.5% of U.S. women become mothers in their lifetimes. In our culture, women are the primary 72 nurturers and caretakers, largely responsible for children, the elderly, and the infirm. Indeed, Justice O'Connor's own life has reflected this pattern. After 73 the birth of her second child, it was she, not her husband, who interrupted a legal career and spent five years out of the paid workforce. 74 For most women, motherhood is a defining experience that intensifies their 75 perceptions of children and childhood. As the first mother on the Supreme Court, Justice O'Connor might have been expected to show a heightened interest in and concern for children and those who depend upon the care of others. To some extent, she has. But despite O'Connor's considerable enthusiasm for cases involving children, people with disabilities, and others who are to some degree dependent, her treatment of children is complex and seemingly inconsistent. At times her response to children is warm and engaged, but at other times she has been cool and indifferent. Justice O'Connor's opinions in Casey and in 76 Hodgson v. Minnesota, two cases about minors' access to abortion, illustrate 77 some of the paradoxes.
The statutes challenged in Casey and Hodgson both placed additional burdens on a woman seeking an abortion if she happened to be a minor. Each statute required that the minor notify her parent(s) of her intent to undergo an 78. Both statutes also allowed the minor to argue to a judge that she was sufficiently mature to make the abortion decision without her parents' participation. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 844, 899 (explaining the statutory "judicial bypass" procedures); Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 426. This "judicial bypass" process is, however, not relevant to the present discussion.
79 These positions seem paradoxical because, from the perspective of the young woman seeking an abortion, it is the mandatory participation of a parent-not the number of parents participating-that is the problem. But Justice O'Connor does not focus on the minor. In both cases, her gaze is firmly directed elsewhere, to an entity she sometimes fails to name but frequently defends-the family. abused, the parental notification requirement in the abortion statute can be waived. However, the parent must be notified that the child has made the claim of abuse! In short, under the statute, avoiding notification will result in notification. 86 In the minors' abortion cases the wishes of children and the interests of their parents arguably collide. In Hodgson, O'Connor saw this potential clash and protected the minor, while in Casey, unpersuaded that a conflict existed, O'Connor chose the family. In so doing, she echoed the position she had taken just one year prior to Hodgson, when she joined Justice Scalia's controversial opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D. In that case, the Court upheld a California 87 statute that barred absolutely a man's claim that he was the father of a child born to a married woman. Neither the mother nor her husband chose to contest the child's paternity, and under California law that ended the matter. Rejecting both the man's assertion of paternity and claims made on behalf of the child, the plurality concluded that Michael H. and the child he said was his had no liberty interest in a relationship with each other. O'Connor wrote a brief concurrence, However, she expressed no discomfort with the plurality's decision that California may protect the integrity of a marital family by completely foreclosing the claims of a putative father. For O'Connor as well as Scalia, the child's interests were identical to those of her mother and her mother's husband. Vernonia challenged a school district policy that required drug testing as a condition of participation in interscholastic sports. Students who wished to play a sport had to consent to drug testing and obtain the written consent of their parents as well. Each athlete was tested at the beginning of the season for her 94 sport. In addition, each week, all the athletes' names were placed in a "pool." Ten percent of the names in the pool were drawn at random and those students were required to undergo additional testing. The Court upheld the school 95 district's rule, but Justice O'Connor authored a scathing dissent.
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia described the students in the Vernonia public schools as having been "committed to the temporary custody of the State as schoolmaster." He noted that "[t]raditionally at common law, and 96 still today, unemancipated minors lack some of the most fundamental rights of self-determination-including even the right of liberty in its narrow sense, i.e., the right to come and go at will." 97 Justice O'Connor disagreed with a passion and vehemence missing from many of her opinions. She began by noting that among the eighteen million students in American public schools are millions of schoolboy and schoolgirl athletes, "an overwhelming majority of whom have given school officials no reason whatsoever to suspect they use drugs at school." Yet, as a result of the hold children suspected of being in the United States illegally (but not suspected of a crime) in a detention facility when there was a responsible adult willing to assume the child's care pending the deportation hearing. As in Vernonia, the majority opinion in Flores was written by Justice Scalia. In his hands, the issue took on a rather odd cast, becoming "the alleged right of a child who has no available parent, close relative, or legal guardian, and for whom the government is responsible, to be placed in the custody of a willing-and-able private custodian rather than of a government-operated or government-selected child-care institution." Dissenting, Justice Stevens offered a somewhat different 103 definition: "The right at stake in this case is not the right of detained juveniles to be released to one particular custodian rather than another, but the right not to be detained in the first place." Ariès's favorite sources was painting, because children were frequently the subjects. It was Ariès who first commented on the Medieval tradition of painting children as miniature adults.
How could it be, he asked, that the greatest 113 painters in human history painted children with adult proportions? Obviously, the great painters of the Medieval period did not lack skill in depicting the human form. What they lacked was a vision of childhood. Those artists merely documented a culture in which there was no sense that a child was anything other than a small adult. Notions of a timetable for human development, particularly psychological development, are creatures of a much later era.
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It is perhaps simplistic, but also revealing to suggest that like a Medieval 120. That an eighth grader may not have felt sufficiently empowered to notify authorities does not seem to have entered into the Justice's thinking. Nor does she focus on the portion of the record where Ms. Gebser states that her teacher was "the person in Lago administration . . . who I most trusted. . . ." Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 2004 n.10 (citation omitted). To Ms. Gebser, her teacher was the administration. He was the chain of command to whom her grievance might be reported. O'Connor fails to consider that an adolescent facing seduction and rape by a teacher might see the world in a very different way than an adult.
121. See id. at 1997.
painter, O'Connor paints children as miniature adults. Unlike some of her colleagues, she refuses to disenfranchise, dismiss, or burden children simply because they are children. She sees them as worthy and deserving-but not as specially deserving. It is their autonomy she champions, not their vulnerability. So, O'Connor insists that children incarcerated by the INS be treated no worse than adults incarcerated by the INS, but she will not join the Flores dissent to argue that because they are children, the petitioners in Flores in fact need different treatment. O'Connor would not allow schools to engage in blanket drug testing of athletes, but she would also not exempt children from the death penalty.
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O'Connor's recent disquisition on sexual harassment in the schools is the latest example of her complex view of children and the law. Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District considered the liability of a school district 116 for a teacher's sexual harassment of a student. The tone of O'Connor's opinion bespeaks sympathy, not disdain. However, while recognizing that a school may sometimes be liable for a teacher's misconduct, O'Connor was unwilling to read Title IX as imposing respondeat superior liability. Instead, she held that a 117 118
Title IX plaintiff must demonstrate that a school had actual knowledge of misconduct and responded with deliberate indifference. 122. O'Connor's choice of language suggests that she believes the sexual "relationship" was not altogether unwelcome. Id. at 1993. "Gebser did not report the relationship to school officials, testifying that while she realized [the teacher's] conduct was improper, she was uncertain how to react and she wanted to continue having him as a teacher." Id. O'Connor seems to miss the point that sexual contact between adults and children is criminalized not to prevent forcible contact, which is already criminal, but to outlaw and punish just this sort of seduction of a lonely and confused adolescent. O'Connor's concurrence in Glucksberg emphasized the painful realities of the dying process: "Death will be different for each of us. For many, the last days will be spent in physical pain and perhaps the despair that accompanies 139. O'Connor's harsh stance towards individuals who have strayed is perhaps most evident in her criminal opinions and in her responses to petitions for federal habeas corpus relief. As a former state prosecutor and one time "law and order" candidate, see supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text, it is perhaps not surprising that O'Connor has typically sided with the state against the claims of criminal defendants. Here too, however, O'Connor's cases reveal an interesting pre-occupation with process and a concern for those individuals-but only those individuals-who can navigate complex procedural mazes. Like Hodgson, Gebser, and Cruzan, O'Connor's habeas cases simultaneously display a reluctance to deny petitioners any access to redress and an insistence that individuals demonstrate the foresight and competence to raise all claims in the correct manner. Those petitioners who cannot master the rigors of O'Connor's habeas jurisprudence (or afford an attorney sufficiently competent to do so) seem not to merit her sympathy. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991) (denying habeas relief to any federal claims defaulted in state court "unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law"); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989) (O'Connor J., plurality opinion) (refusing to review "new" claims on habeas corpus unless the rule applies to matters "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" or places "primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe") ( contrast. That case was brought by a group of women with blue collar, factory jobs who had previously prevailed in a Title VII sex discrimination claim against Ford. Ford sought to toll the accrual of backpay liability by offering the plaintiffs the jobs they had originally been denied, but without retroactive seniority. The women testified that they had rejected the offer because they were worried about layoffs, which were then prevalent in the automobile industry. 157 In considering the nature and extent of the damages owed by Ford, O'Connor displayed an almost Lochnerian disregard for the plaintiffs' job security 158 concerns. According to O'Connor, requiring Ford to offer retroactive seniority would hurt those "innocent" male employees who had accrued seniority during the pendency of plaintiffs' litigation.
O'Connor was willing to force the 159 successful plaintiffs to choose between a lower backpay award and job security in order to protect the seniority of non-parties to the litigation. Interestingly, 160 O'Connor imposed this choice in the absence of any statutory language mentioning the so-called innocent victims.
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The differences and similarities in O'Connor's approaches to Price Waterhouse and Ford are revealing. In both cases, O'Connor is willing to deviate from strict statutory text and from the dictates of prior precedent. In both cases, the reader senses that O'Connor's sensitivity to the facts drives the doctrine. Yet, her perception of the two scenarios is quite different. O'Connor, the successful career woman, can understand and empathize with Ann Hopkins and the humiliation she suffered. But O'Connor has little appreciation of the 162 economic vicissitudes faced by the women working at Ford and their concerns for job security are foreign to her. Once again, her experiential reasoning is bounded by the scope of her own life experiences.
A similar myopia is evident in Justice O'Connor's decisions on affirmative action. Since joining the Court, O'Connor has played a pivotal role in fashioning the Court's affirmative action jurisprudence, developing the doctrinal attack on race conscious remedies. Echoing her concern for "innocent victims" in Ford, elevation of the interests of white contractors who might be treated less favorably because of affirmative action policies over the interests of African American contractors who had been competitively disadvantaged by historically segregated markets. 166 O'Connor's methodology in the affirmative action cases is entirely consistent with her approach in other areas. She shows little concern for precedent. Indeed, in Adarand she was willing to overrule an opinion that was barely five years old. Moreover, although O'Connor is widely known for championing states' O'Connor's opinions in the affirmative action cases also reflect her discomfort with absolutist positions. After ruling in Adarand that strict scrutiny must always be applied to race conscious remedies, she backed away from the The question remains: Did it make a difference? Does it matter that women now sit on the high court? Of course it does. It matters politically and it 173 matters symbolically. While the impact is not quantifiable, it is no doubt important to young women entering the legal profession to see the absence of a glass ceiling at the Supreme Court.
And it likely matters in other ways as well. Our review of O'Connor's opinions demonstrates that to a large degree she does ask the woman question. In her writings we see a particular concern for and engagement with issues that have historically affected women's lives. While, no doubt, some male justices have also been deeply involved with these issues, O'Connor's absorption is 174 likely not coincidental. As a woman who has had children and experienced discrimination in the workplace, she has particular empathy and concern for one important subset of the cases before her.
Moreover O'Connor's reliance upon contextual and experiential reasoning is often the source of her disagreement with recognizably feminist goals.
The scholarly focus on O'Connor's experiences as a woman has often obscured the many ways in which her experiences are more similar to than different from those of her male colleagues. Supreme Court Justices have traditionally been white, Anglo-Saxon Protestants from the middle or upper classes, with law degrees from prestigious institutions. Justice O'Connor fits 180 this mold perfectly.
Thus, if it is true that Justice O'Connor frequently employs experiential reasoning, it should not be surprising that the experiences that resonate with her are those typical of educated, upper middle class, white women. Her experiences may give her an acute understanding of some plaintiffs' circumstances, but they
